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POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS. 
By Otto Kirchheimer. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
1961. Pp. 452. $8.50. 
This book is a definitive study of the use of the legal process by the state 
against individuals as an instrument of political power. "Something is 
called political if it is thought to relate in a particularly intensive way to 
the interests of the community." (p. 26) This reviewer has put the 
meaning of the term political as follows: "As the intensity of attachment of 
the actors in a situation of conflict to the competing values involved therein 
increases and the number of actors in the society who are involved in such 
value conflict increases, the likelihood will increase of the characterization 
of the situation as one of a political, rather than a legal, nature .... When 
conflict in a society involves competing group demands based on in-
compatible values held by such groups, its resolution is typically the task 
of the political process and institutions, rather than the legal."1 In the 
view of Justice Jackson, decisions which are "confided to the political 
departments of the government ... are delicate, complex, and involve large 
elements of prophecy ... and should be undertaken only by those directly 
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil."2 
The political trial involves the prosecution by the state of one or more 
individuals for the commission of criminal offenses. The offenses may be 
either common crimes or criminal acts directed against the state, such as 
treason and sedition. Modem security legislation seeks "to protect the 
political order from any intellectual, propagandist, and especially organizing 
activity directed toward revolution. . . . [T]he area of genuine political 
criticism is overhung by clouds which hide the light separating fact, fancy 
and wish. It is not easy to disentangle the components and isolate the 
maliciously slanderous contribution. Many a recent statute has ignored the 
difficulty, subjecting legitimate criticism to punitive provisions." (pp. 41, 
43) 
The political trial, as an instrument for achieving and preserving 
political authority, tears an incident loose from the historical context in 
which it was intertwined and turns the "strongest spotlights on it, to disclose 
its minutest detail. ... The past is reconstructed for the sake of the future 
as a possible weapon in the battle for political domination." The trial 
requires a "segment of history" to be reconstructed. Although the past 
segment is part of "a still present conflict," the judge is allowed "to 
disregard its present elements and treat it exclusively as a past event." But 
any trial entails risk that its reconstruction of a past event through the 
1 CARLSTON, LAw AND ORGANIZATION IN "WORLD SOCIETY, ch. VII (to be published by 
the University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1962) • 
2 Chicago &: So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103, Ill (1948). 
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testimony of witnesses will not take place as anticipated. In the political 
trial, it is imperative that witnesses reenact their predetermined roles with 
scrupulous fidelity, otherwise the political message which the trial was 
intended to communicate will be lost. (pp. 110-12) 
The use of the legal process to suppress groups who dissent in principle 
from an established regime "has been directed so far against small groups 
of little importance in domestic affairs .... Open repression ... is bound 
to miss the target and repel friends when the persecuted group assumes 
the stature of a mass movement, controlling a large segment (say, more than 
twenty percent) of the popular vote .... Even if a combination of social 
and economic pressure and police operations were enough to enforce the 
ban, there might be enough resistance to throw the judicial machinery out 
of gear and cancel what is the benefit of limited repression, the chance to 
preserve intact the legal process and the framework of democratic institu-
tions." (pp. 159-60) 
The degree of consensus of a society upon a single value system or, put 
in opposing terms, the heterogeneity of a society in terms of its sharing of 
values and the priority accorded values, is a factor of first importance in 
the viability of its legal system. The author develops this principle as 
follows: "The meaning of legal consciousness in a heterogeneous society 
thus offers special problems. If no informal consensus exists on fundamental 
community issues, the judges cannot play their traditional role in realizing 
the community value structure and pointing it up in relation to specific 
issues .... Impartiality presupposes a commonly accepted starting pro-
position. If as his point of departure the judge uses propositions which 
are emphatically rejected by substantial elements in the community, he 
will not be able to rely on the presumption of obedience owed to his office, 
even if he can show that he has adhered with some consistency to his initial 
proposition." (p. 215) 
Dissent from the politics of an industrial society will reject the ethic of 
conformity and embrace instead loyalty to a group or cause: "The politics 
of an industrial society have often become a rational interplay of interest 
organizations whose outward form is a gigantic and permanent popularity 
contest. Members of the legal profession functioning as custodians of the 
political game must themselves conform to its rules and precepts. Why, 
then, should anyone else be privileged to reject the prevailing political 
framework and insist on recreating politics in the image of a community 
resting on loyalty to group or cause rather than on rational, civilized, if 
uninspiring, calculation of profit and loss?" 
The lawyer's task in a political trial taking place in a mechanized, 
standardized, conformist society is to use "creative ingenuity ... in whipping 
diffuse elements of a given situation into convincing enough shape to obtain 
a favorable reaction for his client." (p. 243) A functionary of the Czech 
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Lawyers' Organization pointed to the dichotomy of the lawyer's devotion 
to the interest of his client and public interest, which is involved in a 
political trial, as follows: "If the lawyer wants to keep to the principle 
that he has to preserve the interest of his clients in conformity with the 
interests of society and the principle of objective truth, he has to analyze 
clearly every case. He has to conform to the objective truth and the 
interests of society. For this reason we use the term 'justified interest of 
the client,' and only those interests may be taken care of by the lawyer." 
(p. 244) (Emphasis supplied.) 
The author examines the history of the manner in which political 
trials have been used to protect regimes from subversion and overthrow. 
The principles governing the use of political trials as a support for authority 
are elucidated and developed through illustrative examples. The requisite 
characteristics of the roles of the defendant and his lawyer, together with 
the prosecutor and the judge, are thoroughly explored. There are many 
perceptive statements about the nature of the judicial process and the task 
of the judge in trials of this character. 
One chapter is devoted to the operation of the judicial process in 
societies characterized by "democratic centralism," in which the judiciary 
became integrated with the political institutions. In such societies, the 
judiciary becomes an instrument for attaining the changing political 
objectives of the state. "The essence of socialist legality, then, is guarantee-
ing that orders and signals are unfailingly observed at all subordinate levels. 
. . . When policies and official interpretation change, legality attaches to 
the new task at hand. Under no condition is it called upon to mediate 
between today's objectives of the sovereign and yesterday's expectations 
of the subject." (p. 298) 
The Nuremberg trials are explored as an aspect of trials by successor 
regimes. They are termed "the most important 'successor' trial in modem 
history." With respect to the crime against peace charge, the author states: 
"Had the noble purpose of the crime against peace charge succeeded, had 
it helped to lay a foundation for a new world order, the uncertain juridical 
foundation of the charge would now be overlooked and the enterprise 
praised as the rock on which the withdrawal of the states' rights to conduct 
aggressive warfare came to rest. At the coalition pursuing the Nuremberg 
enterprise broke up before the ink on the Nuremberg judgment had time 
to dry, the dissensions among the wartime partners threw a shadow over 
the whole affair." (pp. 323, 324) 
'W"ith regard to the crimes against humanity charge, the author 
concludes: "The newly coined crimes against humanity concept (Article 6c 
of the charter) corresponds to a deeply felt concern over the social realities 
of our age: the advent of policies intent on and leading to debasing or 
blotting out the existence of whole nations or races. But if the social and 
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political mechanism employed in such cases is unfortunately very clear, the 
legal formulas to cover and repress such actions remain problematic. In the 
absence of a world authority to establish the boundary line between atrocity 
beyond the pale and legitimate policy reserved for the individual state, 
the French government and its Algerian foes, the South African government 
and the representatives of the downtrodden negro and colored population, 
not to mention the Hungarian regime and its adversaries and victims, might 
continue to have a very different viewpoint on the meaning of the concept." 
(p. 326) 
The final appraisal of Nuremberg is that: "The concrete condition 
under which the Nuremberg litigation arose and the too inclusive scope 
of the indictment may make it difficult for us to separate the circumstantial 
elements which it shares with all other successor trials from its own lasting 
contribution: that it defined where the realm of politics ends or rather, is 
transformed into the concerns of the human condition, the survival of 
mankind in both its universality and diversity." (p. 341) 
The concluding portion of the book is entitled "Political Justice 
Modified: Asylum and Clemency." It embodies a "search for rational 
elements in asylum' and clemency practice." (p. 349) 
This review has summarized the highlights of the author's thesis to 
demonstrate the thoughtful, analytical manner in which data of political 
trials are employed to develop in a creative way significant principles and 
propositions in political and legal theory. The literature of law and 
jurisprudence has only episodically and tangentially dealt with the problem 
of the political trial, which the author investigates with such thoroughness. 
This study focuses directly upon the principal aspects of the problem and 
is a most important contribution. 
Kenneth S. Carlston, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Illinois 
